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Identity governance · Microsoft Sentinel

Review user and administrator security-info changes

Retain actor, target and changed-property evidence for successful authentication security-info updates without treating registration as account compromise.

Before you run

Data & scope

Required tables
AuditLogs
Time window
24 hours
  • Microsoft Entra ID connector with AuditLogs available for 24 hours and permission to inspect audit payloads.
  • Any Microsoft Entra ID license supports audit ingestion; workspace query permissions and relevant administration evidence are required.

Documentation review by Codex (AI). No live-tenant execution or detection-performance claim. Validate schema, data coverage and expected results in your workspace.

Kusto Query Language
Download .kql
// Hunting starter. Documentation checked 2026-11-13; not tenant-tested.
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d) and TimeGenerated <= now()
| extend AuditOperation = coalesce(ActivityDisplayName, OperationName)
| where AuditOperation in~ ("User registered security info", "User updated security info",
    "User changed default security info", "User deleted security info",
    "Admin registered security info", "Admin updated security info", "Admin deleted security info")
| where Result =~ "success"
| extend ActorObjectId = coalesce(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id),
        tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)),
    ActorName = coalesce(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName),
        tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)),
    ActorIP = coalesce(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
| mv-expand Target = TargetResources
| where tostring(Target.type) =~ "User"
| extend TargetObjectId = tostring(Target.id), TargetName = tostring(Target.displayName),
    ChangedProperties = Target.modifiedProperties
| project TimeGenerated, AADTenantId, AuditId = Id, AuditOperation, ActorObjectId,
    ActorName, ActorIP, TargetObjectId, TargetName, ChangedProperties, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| take 200

Read-only query. Run in your own authorized workspace after checking prerequisites.

Authentication security-info changes deserve attention because they can change how an account recovers access or satisfies future authentication. This hunt selects successful registration, update, default-method and deletion activities initiated by users or administrators. It is a change-review tool, not a determination that the new method belongs to an attacker.

Keep the actor and target distinct

The actor fields come from the initiating user or application. The target comes from each User entry in TargetResources. They can be different identities during an administrative reset or help-desk workflow. A display name is context only; resolve directory and object IDs before correlating other evidence.

The operation list is an explicit subset of the audit activity catalog. It excludes registration starts, reviews and password-reset operations rather than treating them as completed method changes. Future or differently named activities require updating the list after inspecting real events.

ChangedProperties retains the operation-specific payload. A generic audit schema does not guarantee a single field that always contains a method’s type, identifier or full old/new state. Review the actual payload and the current authentication-method inventory through an approved administration path. Target-resource contract.

Investigate intent and subsequent use

Compare the change with an approved enrollment, replacement-device or recovery request. Verify the user through an independent established process. Inspect preceding sign-ins, policy outcomes and unusual account activity, then look for later authentication consistent with the change. A nearby sign-in is not proof that the newly added method was used.

Legitimate onboarding, lost-device recovery and administrator cleanup can produce exactly these events. Prioritize privileged accounts or unexplained administrative actors using a trusted account inventory; this query does not identify privileged users itself. Method details may contain personal information, so keep raw payloads in a restricted investigation workspace.

Validate before relying on the list

Test a benign registration, deletion and administrator-assisted update. Confirm that the target user and initiating actor are correctly distinguished. Check an unsuccessful operation and a registration-start event to ensure they are excluded as intended.

The result counts expanded target rows rather than unique incidents, and the latest 200 rows are displayed. This documentation-checked hunt has not been run in a tenant. Empty output requires confirming audit ingestion and vocabulary. Microsoft’s token theft playbook provides a wider investigation context when a security-info change occurs alongside session compromise evidence.

Verify the source

Microsoft references

  1. Microsoft Learn — AuditLogs table schema ↗
  2. Microsoft Learn — Microsoft Entra audit activities ↗
  3. Microsoft Learn — Target resource contract ↗
  4. Microsoft Learn — Token theft investigation ↗
Before turning a hunt into an alert

Measure normal activity, validate known test cases, account for ingestion delays, choose a threshold and entity mapping, and assign an owner. Results require investigation.

Follow the detection learning path →